Abstract: This paper provides a political economy analysis of (de)centralization when local public goods -with spillovers e¤ects -can be substitutes or complements. Depending on the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy to either 'conservative' or to 'liberal' representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the …rst case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover e¤ects. Hence, with a common …nancing rule, centralization is welfare improving if and only if both public good externalities and the degree of complementarity between local public goods are both relatively large.
Introduction
There is a large literature on …scal federalism which focuses on the optimal allocation of powers between the central and local governments. The "Decentralization Theorem" of Oates (1972) states that the choice of a centralized system over a decentralized one depends on the bene…ts of internalizing externalities relative to the costs of policy uniformity. Recently, this trade-o¤ has been re-examined from a political economy perspective with the result that centralization may not be the most e¢ cient system even though centralized policy can be di¤erentiated across localities.
A potential de…ciency of a centralized system is that the costs of local public spending are shared through a common budget, thus creating a con ‡ict of interest between citizens in di¤erent localities. For instance, Besley and Coate (2003) develop a two-region model of local public spending and show that, with a cooperative legislature, each median voter has an incentive to strategically delegate bargaining power to a representative with higher demand for public spending. The reason is that the appointment of a 'liberal' representative is a commitment device to extract more of the common budget, which in turn results in too much public spending. 1 Their analysis has been extended in several directions. In particular, Dur and Roelfsema (2005) consider that some costs cannot be shared across regions and then focus on the …nancing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation under a cooperative legislature.
In the literature on the political economy of …scal (de)centralization, it is typically assumed that there are no strategic interactions among regions or that the total amount of public good consumption available in a particular region corresponds to a weighted sum of the amounts that are locally provided by all regions -with the weights re ‡ecting the spillovers across regions. This 'summation technology'implies 'perfect'substitutability between local public investments and it originates from the canonical model of private provision of a pure public good, where the good's overall level is de…ned as the arithmetic sum of individual contributions (see Bergstrom et al., 1986) .
However, as …rst pointed out by Hirshleifer (1983) , public goods can take a variety of di¤erent forms for which the perfect-substitutes assumption is questionable. He then proposed two other 'social composition functions'for aggregating individual contributions. With the 'weakest-link'technology, the total level of public good is given by the smallest individual contribution, while it is given by the greatest contribution for the 'best-shot'technology. In the …rst case, Hirshleifer (1983) used the example of a circular island that needs to be protected by a dike and for which the e¤ective level of protection (against ‡oods) is determined by the lowest portion of the dike. For best-shot public goods, one can think of discovering a research breakthrough -e.g. a cure for a degenerative disease -where the payo¤ is determined by the greatest research e¤ort. Cornes (1993) and more recently Cornes and Hartley (2007a) went one step further by considering 1 In fact, strategic delegation can nullify any element of cooperativeness within the legislature (see Cheikbossian, 2000) .
a CES 'social composition function'for aggregating individual contributions. Such a technology allows them to consider the intermediate cases of 'weaker-link' and 'better-shot' public goods. For example, in the case of a 'weaker-link'public good, the smallest contribution has the largest marginal impact on the overall level of public good provision but the impact of contributions by others is not equal to zero (due, for example, to di¤erences in the island's topography in Hirshleifer's example). Sandler (1997 Sandler ( , 1998 ) and Arce and Sandler (2001) pointed out that these types of public goods may also be prevalent in many situations involving the provision of 'transnational'public goods stemming from regional public investments, with spillover e¤ects from one region to the other. By way of illustration of transnational 'weaker-link' public goods, they brie ‡y refer to the cases of atmospheric monitoring, cyberspace virus control, disease control or peacekeeping. 2 In the present analysis, we revisit the issue of the (de)centralization provision of local public goods from a political economy perspective, with the use of a framework that allows for any degree of substitutability/complementarity between local public investments as well as for any degree of public good spillovers. More speci…cally, we consider a model with two regions, each providing a local public good that bene…ts the other region. The e¤ective level of public good consumption in each region results from a CES aggregation function of public investments in the two regions. Furthermore, we introduce spillover e¤ects by weighting foreign public investment by an exogenous parameter and, so, one unit of public investment abroad does not entail the same marginal public bene…t than when this unit is provided domestically.
The (de)centralization of decision-making is framed by a two-stage policy game. In the …rst stage, voters in each region elect by majority voting a representative. In the second stage, the elected local representatives choose independently of each other the level of public investment for their own region in case of decentralized decision-making. Under centralization, however, the two representatives choose local public investments so as to maximize joint surplus. We also assume in this case that local public spending can be funded by both a common lump-sum tax and by a local tax within a range between 'pure'common …nancing and 'pure'local …nancing. Finally, in our analysis, median voters are decisive and have exactly the same preferences so that we focus exclusively on symmetric equilibria.
The degree of substitutability/complementarity between local public investments relative to the elasticity of the marginal valuation for total public good consumption determine whether local public investments are strategic substitutes or complements. We then show that, under decentralization, each median voter strategically delegates policy to a representative with a lower (respectively higher) taste parameter for public good consumption than herself as local public goods are strategic substitutes (respectively 2 Interestingly, they state that "weaker-link public goods resemble strategic complements " (p. 497). For 'better-shot' public goods, they brie ‡y refer to the cases of the development of a vaccine or public policies against international terrorism.
They conclude that "better-shot public goods are akin to strategic substitutes " (p. 497). However, they do not analyze the nature of strategic interactions between countries as a function of the type of public good. Instead, they analyze correlated strategies for speci…c numerical examples of 'weaker-link'and 'better-shot'transnational public goods. complements). In any case, there is underprovision of local public goods under a decentralized system and consequently the delegation process may accentuate or mitigate the free-rider problem in public good provision. Under centralization, however, median voters'incentives to delegate policy to a 'conservative' or to a 'liberal' representative depend only on the share of common funding of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover e¤ects. Depending on which case applies, centralized decision-making results in over or under-spending, but the drawback of centralization is decreasing in the degree of complementarity between local public goods. Finally, we analyze which system dominates the other from the median voters'point of view. For example, under 'pure centralization'with a common budget …nancing rule, we show that centralization dominates decentralization if and only if both the spillover parameter and the degree of complementarity between local public investments are both relatively large.
Our results contribute to the previous traditional and political-economy literatures on the (de)centralization provision of local public goods. Besley and Coate (2003) show that centralized provision is preferable to decentralized provision if spillover e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong. The conclusion is thus the same as in the standard approach à la Oates (1972) , with the di¤erence that the costs of centralization result from over-spending decisions due to the appointment of 'liberal'representatives in the central legislature. Dur and Roelfsema (2005) consider that some costs cannot be shared though a common budget, so that the strategic delegation to 'conservative' agents under centralization may also happen. An important feature of these two papers, and of a number of other studies, is that there are no incentives for strategic delegation under decentralized decision-making. The reason is that voters'preferences are separable in the levels of public spending, thus implying that the two regions' allocations are strategically neutral (even though there exists spillover e¤ects). 3 However, Dur and Roelfsema (2005) , in an additional appendix, also consider a 'summation technology'with the public good surplus being given by a (concave) function of the weighed sum of local public goods. 4 This implies that these investments are strategic substitutes and, hence, median voters strategically delegate power to 'conservative'representatives under non-cooperative decision-making. However, they do not investigate the relative performance of the two systems with this extension. In fact, we
show that local public investments must not be perfect substitutes for a centralized system to possibly dominate a decentralized system even though there are large public good spillover e¤ects.
In other words, the trade-o¤ identi…ed by Besley Our paper is also related to the literature that focuses on the voters'incentives for delegating decisionmaking to representatives in the context of environmental policies. For example, Buchholz et al. (2005) show that median voters support representatives that are less 'green' than they are, both under cooperative (centralized) and non-cooperative (decentralized) decision-making. In a strategic trade policy environment à la Brander and Spencer (1985) , Roelfsema (2007) raises the possibility of delegating policy to an 'environmental lover' in case the median voter cares su¢ ciently for the environment. Yet, in a similar manner to the above-mentioned articles, the public bad -i.e. the environmental damage -is modelled as a function of the (weighted) sum of domestic polluting activities.
Last but not least, the use of a more general 'social composition function' raises some technical problems in this kind of two-stage political game. The standard equilibrium concept would be that of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) -in pure strategies. Yet, in the present study, the existence issue is hard to deal with under this notion, except under very speci…c assumptions. 5 Indeed, while representatives' payo¤s are concave in their own strategies, the payo¤s of the decisive voters induced by the public good provision subgame between representatives are seemingly not (quasi-)concave, nor is the induced game necessarily supermodular for all the parameter values. Therefore, we introduce the weaker equilibrium concept of a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE), which ensures that no median voter bene…ts from a small unilateral deviation from her equilibrium strategy. This concept extends to a two-stage game that of a Second-order Locally Consistent Equilibrium (2-LCE) or that of a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) in static models of imperfect competition (see, Gary-Bobo, 1989;
Bonanno 1998). This notion of 'local equilibrium'has also been exploited in models of tax competition, where the existence of a Nash equilibrium remains an issue (see, e.g., Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad, 2005;
Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006).
6 5 In models à la Besley and Coate (2003) or Dur and Roelfsema (2005) , which can be recovered as (two) cases of our framework, a SPNE always exists. We can also show that such an equilibrium exists under a decentralized system when local public investment are strategic complements (but not too complements). For more details, see the additional appendix, which is available upon request. 6 In this literature, most authors just assume the existence of a (general) Nash equilibrium and few of them have explicitly focused on the existence problem (see, e.g., Laussel and Le Breton, 1998; Rothstein, 2007) . More closely related to the present analysis, Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyze tax competition between two countries and where the policy-maker, in each country, is elected by majority voting. It is thus a two-stage game with strategic delegation e¤ects. However, they implicitly assume the existence of an equilibrium by focusing on the …rst-order conditions only. This practice is also common in the literature on strategic trade policy with governments choosing (non-cooperatively) their trade policies prior to the time that …rms engage in market competition (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985; Eaton and Grossman, 1986 ).
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the framework for our analysis.
Sections 3 and 4 present our political economy analysis of a decentralized and a centralized system, respectively. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of one system relative to the other and we also compare in details our results with those of previous studies. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider an economy of two equally sized regions, indexed by j = A; B, with the region size normalized to
1. There are three goods in the economy, a private good x and two local public goods -or investments -e A and e B ; each one associated with a particular region. All individuals have identical endowments in private goods y and producing one unit of local public good e j costs one unit of the private good. There are two additional important features in the model. First, the total amount of public good consumption in region j does not coincide with the amount locally provided because of the existence of cross-regional spillovers.
Second, the two local public goods can be substitutes or complements. Speci…cally, the e¤ ective level of public good consumption in region j, for a given vector of local public investments e (e j ; e j ) 2 < 2 + , is given by
2 [0; 1] represents the spillover parameter and the two special cases where = 0 and = 1 correspond, respectively, to the two polar cases of 'pure local public goods'and 'pure global public goods'(also referred to as the case of 'perfect spillovers'). 7 2 f[0; 1) [ (1; +1)g measures the degree of complementarity between the two local public goods and the elasticity of substitution is 1= . For = 0, we have 'perfect substitutability'between local public goods and equation (1) becomes the standard 'summation technology', i.e. G j = e j + e j . 8 For ! +1 we have 'perfect complementarity' and, in the limit, equation (1) becomes G j =Minfe j ; e j g (referred as to the 'weakest-link'function). Finally, if > 1 and e j = 0 or e j = 0, the function is not well de…ned. Hence, we will also take the limit of (1) as e j ! 0 or e j ! 0, which means G j (e) = 0 in this case. 9 7 Because of the spillover parameter, there are two levels of e¤ective public good consumption -hence two di¤erent CES 'social composition functions'-one for each region. For this reason, our model does not belong to the class of "aggregative games", where each player's payo¤ depends on her own action and the same aggregate of all players'actions (see, Corchón, 1994; Cornes and Hartley, 2007a, 2007b ; and Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013). 8 The denomination of 'perfect-substitutes'for = 0 is actually abusive. Indeed, even in this case, one unit of investment abroad does not entail the same marginal bene…t than when this unit is provided domestically because of the spillover parameter. So, the adjective 'perfect' must be understood as referring to an in…nite elasticity of substitution between the two levels of public investments. 9 Note that (1) is also discontinuous at = 1. This case is excluded from our analysis.
Individuals di¤er in the intensity of their preferences for public good consumption. The preferences of a citizen in region j with taste parameter are given by
where is symmetrically distributed over the ; interval with > 0, and with the mean and median values both equal to m j for region j (for j = A; B). Furthermore, F (:) is increasing and concave with
, where 2 (0; 1).
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In each region, the cost of providing the local public good is …nanced by a uniform head tax j on local residents of region j. We will assume throughout that citizens'endowments in private goods y are su¢ ciently high to always allow positive consumption of the private good x. There are thus no wealth e¤ects and, so, we can focus on the public good surplus.
Decentralization
Under decentralization, the level of local public investment in region j is decided by an elected (regional) representative and is …nanced by local taxation only, so that the uniform head tax in region j is such that j = e j . The representative is chosen by and amongst the voters of the region. Thus, we have a two-stage policy game to solve. In the …rst stage, voters in each region elect their representative by majority rule.
In the second stage, the two representatives simultaneously choose the level of public spending for their own region.
We work by backward induction. Let the type of the elected representative in region j be j . Given the other representative's policy choice e j , the representative of region j chooses e j 0 to maximize her own public good surplus
We …rst establish the following Lemma, which will prove useful in further analysis.
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Lemma 1. For , local public investments are strategic complements -i.e. @ 2 v j (e)=@e j @e j 0 -while they are strategic substitutes -i.e. @ 2 v j (e)=@e j @e j 0 -for . 12 can also be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption. Thus, 1 0 This type of utility function (2), with F (:) being an isoelastic function and G(:) being a CES function, has been used by Ray et al. (2007) to analyze voluntary participation in a joint project with imperfect substitution between individual e¤orts (but without spillover e¤ects). They focus on how (exogenous) share vectors a¤ect joint surplus. Note also that to save on notations, we will work with the F (:) formulation throughout the text and the appendix. 1 1 The proofs of the lemma and propositions are given in the appendix. decisions on local public investments are strategic complements (substitutes) if the inverse of the elasticity of substitution -or the degree of complementarity -between local public goods given by is greater (lower) than the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption. In the special case of = , the cross-derivatives are zero, which means that the two regions'allocations are strategically neutral. This corresponds to the setup considered by Besley and Coate (2003) , where voters'preferences are assumed to be separable in the levels of local public spending.
We now characterize the equilibrium outcome in the second stage of the game. We have:
Lemma 2. (i) Given the types j and j of the two representatives, the non-cooperative game of public good provision admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, region j's public good provision (for j = A; B) is characterized by the following …rst-order condition
with equality for e j > 0.
(ii) For 2 f[0; 1) [ (1; +1)g, there is a unique interior equilibrium with e A > 0 and e B > 0. For 2 (1; +1), there is another corner equilibrium which involves e A = e B = 0.
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In other words, given the types of the two representatives ( j ; j ), there is a unique equilibrium with the property that local public investments are strictly positive in the two regions. In this equilibrium, the system given by (4), with equality for j = A; B, implicitly yields the local public good levels under a decentralized system as functions of the types of the two representatives, i.e. e A ( A ; B ) and e B ( A ; B ).
If 2 (1; +1) there also exists a corner equilibrium, which we ignore. It is also worth pointing out that the best-response functions of the regions'representatives are equivalent to the (necessary and su¢ cient) …rst-order conditions and that with strategic substitutes (complements), best-response functions are decreasing (increasing). The pro…le of equilibrium response functions are depicted in Figure 1 for 2 [0; ), and in Figure 2 for 2 ( ; +1).
INSERT FIGURES
We now turn to the election stage. Citizens, in each region, vote simultaneously to elect their rep- 
14 As shown by Rothstein (1990 Rothstein ( , 1991 and Gans and Smart (1996) , the single-crossing property guarantees that a Condorcet winner exists and that it coincides with the preferred candidate of the voter with the median preference given by m j .
We are interested in an equilibrium of the two-stage game, that is a majority preferred pair of local representatives ( A ; B ) such that e ( A ; B ) solves the system given by Lemma 2 -i.e. equation (4) with equality for j = A; B. The equilibrium concept that …rst comes to mind is that of a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies. That is, the median type in region j prefers j to any other type 2 ; , given the other region's representative type j , and given the resulting subgame of local public good provision. To prove the existence of such an equilibrium in this two-stage game structure is very problematic. Indeed, while representatives'payo¤s are concave in their own strategies, the payo¤s of the decisive voters induced by the equilibrium of the public good provision subgame between representatives are seemingly not (quasi-)concave. Nor is the induced game necessarily supermodular for all the parameter values of the model. 15 However, in the case of a decentralized system, quasi-concavity of each median voter's payo¤ can be easily established for = 0 and = . In the …rst case, local public investments are perfect substitutes while there are no strategic interactions in local public spending in the second case. Again, following Besley and Coate (2003) , these two speci…c cases have been extensively studied in the literature. One can also show that median voters' payo¤ are quasi-concave in our setup for 2 [ ; 1). However, for 2 f(0; ) [ (1; +1)g ; one need to use a weaker concept than that of a SPNE. We thus introduce the concept of Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) -in pure strategies.
Let (again) m j be the taste parameter of the median voter in region j. Her payo¤ is thus given by
We de…ne a LNSPE under decentralization as follows:
De…nition 1: Under decentralization, a vector j ; j is a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) if and only if (i) (@w j (m j ; j ; j ) =@ j ) ( ) = 0, and @ 2 w j (m j ; j ; j ) =@ 2 j ( ) < 0 for j = A; B; (ii) (e j ( ) ; e j ( )) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the Stage-2 subgameand is characterized by (4) in Lemma 2 with equality for j = A; B. Gans and Smart (1996) , which is essentially equivalent to the 'order restriction'of preferences …rst formulated by Rothstein (1990 Rothstein ( , 1991 In words, each median voter's equilibrium strategy ensures a local maximum of her payo¤ function, given the equilibrium strategy of the other median voter and the resulting equilibrium policy outcome in stage 2. Hence, in a LNSPE, no median voter bene…ts from a small unilateral deviation from her equilibrium strategy. Of course, every LNSPE is a SPNE but the converse is not true. It might indeed be possible that there is a representative type j lying outside the neighborhood of j which yields a higher payo¤ for region j's median voter. In short, the LNSPE is a weaker concept than that of subgame perfection, but is nevertheless characterized by the …rst-order conditions.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this concept of "equilibrium" is closely related to that of a secondorder locally consistent equilibrium (2-LCE), as introduced by Gary-Bobo (1989) in the context of an imperfectly general equilibrium model, or to the equivalent concept of a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) used by Bonanno (1988) in a static oligopoly game. 16 The justi…cation is that …rms have only local knowledge of their demand curves (and therefore of their pro…t functions), so that they experiment through small variations of their strategy variable and stop when they reach a local maximum. The notion of LNE has also been exploited in models of tax competition (see, e.g., Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad, 2005, or Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) -where the existence of (general) Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) has proved di¢ cult to establish. 17 For simplifying notations, let e j denote e j ( j ; j ). In a LNSPE, the representative type j for the region j's median voter, given the type of the other region's representative j , must satisfy following …rst-order condition,
Using (4), this expression can be rewritten as
Observe that j is larger (respectively lower) than m j if @e j =@ j is positive (respectively negative).
Therefore, in general, median voters delegate policy to representatives with di¤erent preferences than their own.
As mentioned above, we assume that the two median voters have identical preferences -i.e. m A = m B = m -and we focus on a symmetric equilibrium with median voters delegating policy to (two)
representatives of the same type, thus resulting in a symmetric equilibrium level of local public good provision -i.e. e A = e B . We can then state the following Proposition. (i) The median voter in each region -with taste parameter m for public good consumption -delegates policy to a representative with taste parameter
(ii) The median voter in each region delegates policy to a representative with a lower (respectively higher )
taste parameter for public good consumption than herself as = 0 or
We can also establish the following corollary about the ine¢ ciency of a decentralized system.
Corollary 1: (i)
The unique LNSPE under decentralization is always characterized by under-provision of local public investments.
(ii) The extent of under-provision is increasing in the spillover parameter and decreasing in the degree of complementarity between local public investments given by .
Proof: Let …rst determine the optimal level of local public investment common to both regions. Recall …rst that, by assumption, mean and median voters have identical preferences within and across regions.
Therefore, the social optimum is given by the maximization of the sum of median voter utilities. With the F (:) function being an isoelastic function -i.e. F (G) = G
1
-this optimal level is given by maximizing mG 1 e , with G = (1+ )
1= (1 ) e. This yieldsê = h m(1 )(1 + )
under a decentralized system -and using (4) in Lemma 2 -the symmetric policy outcome is given by
. The ratio of these two levels is thus given byê=e
Using (7), we then havê
which is clearly greater than 1. Hence, the equilibrium of a decentralized system results in too low levels of local public investments compared to the social optimum, even though median voters delegate policy to representatives who put a higher weight on public good consumption than themselves. Furthermore, 1 8 In the proofs of Proposition 1 (for a decentralized system) and 2 (for a centralized system), we assume the existence of a LNSPE and show that, if it the case, this equilibrium is unique and is characterized by the statements given in these two propositions. The proofs of the existence of a LNSPE under decentralization (and under the su¢ cient condition that ) and under centralization are given in a separate appendix. In this second appendix, we also show that, in the case of a decentralized system, there exists a SPNE for = 0 and 2 [ ; 1). This additional appendix is available upon request.
it is straightforward to verify that the term in [:] of equation (8) -and thus the extent of under-provision -is increasing in , but decreasing in . 19 As shown by part (ii) of Proposition 1, delegating policy to a 'conservative' representative actually arises when decisions are strategic substitutes, i.e., when (provided that ). This is because, in that case, citizens in each region realize when electing their representatives that decreasing domestic provision of public goods will induce the other region's representative to increase its investment. To put it di¤erently, each median voter seeks to place the burden of total public good provision on the citizens of the other region. However, these attempts are self-defeating and hence strategic delegation accentuates the free-rider problem. And this is even more so the case as the spillover parameter -as measured by -rises (part (ii) of Corollary 1).
If, however, decisions on local public investments are strategic complements -i.e.
-each median voter delegates policy-making a 'liberal' representative, that is to someone who cares more for public goods than she does because this will induce the other region's representative to also raise its own public investment. These incentives are mutually reinforcing and hence the delegation process takes the equilibrium closer to the optimum. And this is even more so the case as the degree of complementarity between local public investments -as measured by -rises (part (ii) of Corollary 1).
In the special case of = , the utility of voters is separable in the levels of local public investments, thus eliminating strategic interaction between regions. As a result, there are no incentives for strategic delegation and each median voter prefers a candidate of her own type, i.e. j = = m. It follows that the ine¢ ciency of decentralized decision-making is completely characterized by the inability of local governments to internalize externalities. This corresponds to the case analyzed by Besley and Coate (2003) .
Furthermore, one can also observe that in the limiting case of perfect complementarity between local public goods -i.e. ! +1 -we have,
Using e andê in the Proof of Corollary (1), we observe that e =ê, and so the decentralized system yields the social optimum in that case.
If, however, there is perfect substitutability between local public goods -i.e. = 0 -we obtain that
Hence, the 'degree of conservativeness' -as measured by j mj -is increasing in the square of the parameter re ‡ecting the extent of public good externalities when local public investments are perfect 1 9 Let we have 'perfect spillovers'-i.e. = 1 -then median voters delegate policy-making to representatives who do not care to public good consumption at all in order to attempt to put the entire burden of public good provision on the other region. Since the two median voters have the same incentives, no public goods are supplied in equilibrium in this case.
Centralization
Under centralization, the policy outcome is also determined by a two-stage policy game. In the …rst stage, citizens in each region elect their representative in the central legislature. In the second stage, the two representatives bargain over the levels of local public spending. Following Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that the bargaining outcome is given by the maximum sum of the utilities of the two representatives at the bargaining table. 20 We also assume that, under a centralized regime, the level of public spending e j in the jth region is funded by both a general lump-sum tax denoted , and by a local tax denoted t j . The funding split between local taxation and general taxation is exogenous and is parameterized by 2 [0; 1], representing the share of general public funding. The head tax in region j is thus j = +(1 )t j , where = (ej +e j ) 2
and t j = e j . Hence, the head tax in region j can be rewritten as
with j + j = e j + e j . When = 0, we have j = e j and local public spending -decided at the central level -is …nanced by local taxation only. This setup corresponds to the situation analyzed by Buchholz et al. (2005) in which elected governments cooperate over environmental policies so as to internalize a pollution externality but without sharing the costs of 'greener' policies. If, however, = 1, then j = (e j + e j )=2 which corresponds to a 'pure'centralized system with the costs of public goods being shared through a common budget, as it is assumed in Besley and Coate (2003) .
Again, let the types of the elected representatives in region j and j be j and j , respectively. They jointly maximize by the 'universalism' view in the political science literature on distributive politics. According to this view, the elected representatives develop a norm of reciprocity to overcome the problems associated with minimum coalitions (see, e.g., Weingast, 1979; and Shepsle and Weingast, 1981) . Also, decisions in supranational bodies sometimes require unanimity, thus forcing legislators to cooperate. This is the case in the EU for policies falling under the heading of the second pillari.e. common foreign and security policy -and third pillar -i.e. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
with respect to both e j and e j .
We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 4: Given the types j and j of the two representatives, there is unique interior equilibrium outcome under centralized decision-making, which is characterized by the following …rst-order conditions,
This system implicitly yields the local public good levels under a centralized system, as functions of the types of the two representatives, i.e.ẽ A ( A ; B ) andẽ B ( A ; B ).
We now turn to the election stage. If the representatives in regions A and B are of types A and B , a type citizen in region j will have the following public good surplus:
Citizens'preferences over types still satisfy the single-crossing property, which is su¢ cient to apply the median voter result 21 : the representative that is majority-preferred to any other representative is the one that is most preferred by the voter with the median preference m j in region j.
We are still interested in an equilibrium of this two-stage game, that is a majority preferred pair
solves the system given by Lemma 4. Under centralization, the proof of the existence of a SPNE in pure strategies is even more problematic than under decentralization, except for = 0 and = . Therefore, we continue to use the weaker concept of a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE).
The payo¤ of the median voter in region j under centralization is w j (m j ;
In a manner similar to the case of decentralization, we thus de…ne a LNSPE under centralization as follows:
(ii) (ẽ j (~ );ẽ j (~ )) maximizes the joint public good surplus of the two representatives in the Stage-2 subgame -and is characterized by (13) in Lemma 4 for j = A; B.
Again, each median voter's equilibrium strategy ensures a local maximum of her payo¤ function, given the equilibrium strategy of the other median voter and the resulting equilibrium policy outcome in stage 2. 2 1 The Proof is the same as in Lemma 3. Equilibrium public good levels under centralization are implicitly de…ned by (13) for j = A; B. Applying the implicit function theorem together with the fact that aggregate payo¤ given by (12) is strictly concave in e j (see the Proof of Lemma 4), we have that e j and G j (e) are both increasing in j . It follows that the single-crossing property is satis…ed (see the Proof of Lemma 3).
For simplifying notations, letẽ j denoteẽ j ( j ; j ). In a LNSPE, the representative type j for the region j's median voter, given the type of the other region's representative j , must satisfy the following …rst-order condition,
The two median voters have identical preferences, i.e. m A = m B = m. We thus focus on a symmetric equilibrium with median voters delegating policy to (two) representatives of the same type, thus resulting in a symmetric equilibrium level of local public good provision -i.e.ẽ A =ẽ B . We then have the following Proposition. 
(ii) Let~ 2 = (1 + ). Then, the median voter in each region delegates policy to a representative with a higher (respectively lower ) taste parameter for public good consumption than herself, thus resulting in over-provision (respectively under-provision) of local public investments as ~ (respectively ~ ).
Again, median voters delegate policy to representatives with di¤erent preferences than their own. However, as shown by part (ii) of this Proposition, and in contrast to the decentralized system, whether they choose a 'conservative' representative (i.e.~ m) or a 'liberal' representative (i.e.~ m) does not depend on the degree of complementarity between local public investments (given by ) relative to the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption (given by ). It depends only on the funding split between local taxation and general taxation parameterized by relative to the size of public good spillovers given by . More precisely, the larger the share of general funding and the lower the spillovers are, the more likely median voters delegate policy to representatives who put a higher weigh on public good consumption than themselves. Hence, in the extreme case of pork-barrel spending -i.e. representative is a way to shift the burden of public good provision to the other region. Obviously, in either case, these attempts are self-defeating and the equilibrium results in either over-provision or underprovision of local public goods compared to the social optimum that would be obtained in the absence of delegation. (Recall that the two representatives fully cooperate in the central legislature).
The following Corollary makes further statements about the (potential) distortion induced by the delegation process.
Corollary 2: (i) The "optimal cost-sharing rule" resulting in a LNSPE with sincere delegation -i.e.
decreasing (respectively increasing), and hence the extent of over-provision (respectively under-provision)
is decreasing in the degree of complementarity given by . However, the sign of the derivative of~ with respect to is indeterminate.
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The share of general funding given by can be interpreted as a budgetary externality. Part (i) of Corollary 2 intuitively shows that larger public good spillovers must be compensated by a larger budgetary externality to induce sincere delegation and hence an e¢ cient policy outcome under a centralized system.
Local …nancing ( = 0) is only optimal in case of pure local public goods ( = 0), while complete cost sharing ( = 1) is only optimal in case of global public goods ( = 1). In general, when the extent of the budgetary externality is di¤erent from "the optimal cost-sharing rule" given by~ , centralized decision-making is ine¢ cient as is the case of decentralized decision-making. The di¤erence is that the provision of local public goods can be too low, but also too high compared to the social optimum.
These results are reminiscent to those obtained by Dur and Roelfsema (2005) . Again, these authors extend Besley and Coate (2003)'s analysis by considering that some costs cannot be shared among regions and in turn derive the "optimal …nancing rule" that eliminates the incentives for strategic delegation under a centralized (or cooperative) regime. Essentially, they also show that larger public good externalities must be compensated by a greater sharing of the costs of local public spending. 24 However, as usual in the literature, they model public good surplus either as a (weighted) sum of functions -implying no strategic interactions in local public investments -or as a function of the (weighted) sum of local public investments -implying perfect substitutability between these investments.
The novelty here is that the degree of complementarity between local public investments also a¤ects 2 3 The sign of @~ =@ is the same as the sign of its numerator, which is given by:
This term is negative (respectively positive) for larger (respectively lower) than~ = 2 = (1 + ). The sign of @~ =@ is the same as the sign of its numerator, which is given by:
] m. This term can be positive or negative depending on the exact values of the triplet ( ; ; ). 2 4 In Dur and Roelfsema (2005), the …nancing rule of a centralized system is summarized by three parameters: the weight of direct tax costs shared among regions through a common budget; the weight of an indirect utility cost; and the weight of the cross-subsidy from one region to the other. They show that the "optimal" cross-subsidy is increasing in the spillover parameter, which amounts to increase the budgetary externality. Since a linear cost-division rule is imposed, we believe that it is more transparent and clear to describe the …nancing rule of a centralized system by a unique parameter, as in the present framework.
the extent of the distortion induced by strategic delegation under centralized decision-making (as under decentralized decision-making). Indeed, from point (ii) of Corollary 2, we have that a larger degree of complementarity between local public investments -i.e. a higher -decreases the distortion induced by the delegation process in that it decreases the extent of over-provision for ~ , or the extent of under-provision for ~ . In the limit case of 'weakest-link' public goods -i.e. ! +1 -we havẽ j !+1 = m, and so a centralized system yields the social optimum as does a decentralized system in this case. This is also the case if there are 'perfect' public good spillovers -i.e. = 1 -since theñ j =1 = m independently of the degree of complementarity between local public goods (provided > 0). Under a decentralized system, however, the case of 'perfect spillovers'exacerbates the under-provision of public goods (see Corollary 1).
In case of perfect substitutability between local public goods -i.e. = 0 -we obtain that
If furthermore public investments are entirely …nanced by local taxation -i.e. = 0 -then appointed representatives are even more 'conservative' than under a decentralized system since then~ j = =0 = (1 ) m j =0 = 1 2 m. 25 In the other extreme of complete cost sharing ( = 1) and perfect substitutability between local public goods ( = 0), we have delegation to an extreme 'liberal'representative, that is~ j =0; =1 = 2m independently of the size of spillovers given by .
Centralization versus Decentralization
We now investigate which system dominates the other from a social welfare point of view. Recall that by assumption, in each region, there is a continuum of citizens of mass one and that the median voter has the same preferences than the mean voter. Hence, the payo¤ of each region's median voter also represents the social welfare of her region.
The general expressions of the levels of welfare as well as the levels of local public investments under the two systems are given in the appendix. In order to simplify the analysis, we now assume that the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption is such that = 0:
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In this case, we have the following levels of welfare, 2 5 This result is related to that obtained by Buchholz et al. (2005) who show that voters support candidates who are even less green than they are to represent them in the cooperative scenario compared to the isolationist scenario. They also show that in the extreme case of global pollution, elected politicians pay no attention at all to the environment in any scenario. This would correspond to = 1 and = 0 in our setup, with no provision of public goods in equilibrium (as under decentralization in this case; see equation (10)). 2 6 This is consistent with the su¢ cient condition imposed for the existence of a LNSPE under centralization (see Proposition 2 and the separate appendix). The condition for the existence of a LNSPE is that = p 5 2, which is assumed to hold in this section.
under a decentralized system, and
in a centralized system.
The following Proposition considers two extreme …nancing rules under a centralized system: (i) local public spending is entirely …nanced by local taxation (but yet decided at the centralized level), i.e. = 0;
(ii) local public spending is entirely …nanced by general taxation, i.e. = 1.
, then we have:
(i ) When local public investments are …nanced by local taxation only -i.e. = 0 -then centralization always dominates decentralization.
(ii ) When local public investments are …nanced by general taxation only -i.e. = 1 -then centralization dominates decentralization if 3 2 p 2 and
Again, there is always under-provision under a decentralized system whether local public good decisions are strategic substitutes or complements (Corollary 1). From Proposition 2, this is also the case under a centralized system when local public spending is …nanced by local taxation only -i.e. = 0 -since in that case ~ . Actually, it is possible (but not necessary) that, under a centralized system, median voters appoint representatives who are even more conservative than under a decentralized system (which arises, for example, when = 0). However, in this case and according to the …rst part (i) of Proposition 3, the bene…ts from cooperation between representatives under a centralized system -in terms of internalizing public good externalities -are larger than the increased cost of the distortion induced by strategic delegation. In any case, the extent of under-provision is lower under a centralized system and thus this system improves welfare relative to decentralization independently of the size of the public good spillovers and of the degree of complementarity between local public goods. Now let consider the most commonly used assumption of a common …nancing rule -i.e. = 1 -adopted by Besley and Coate (2003) , among others. 27 In this case, a centralized system does not necessarily dominate a decentralized system as shown by the second part (ii) of Proposition 3. Indeed, for = 1, there is over-provision of public goods under centralization (while decentralization is still characterized by under-provision). Thus, centralization is welfare improving if and only if the size of 2 7 The prevalence of this assumption in the literature is justi…ed to some extent since most centralized systems of government operate (roughly) according to such a rule. Indeed, equal cost sharing is very often a constitutionally imposed arrangement. For example, in most European countries, uniform tax rules are at the core of budgeting institutions (see, e.g., Von Hagen, 1992).
spillovers and the degree of complementarity between the two local public goods are both relatively large. Note, however, that~ is a decreasing function of the spillover parameter. Therefore, providing is larger than 3 2 p 2, an increase in its value alleviates the constraint on the minimum degree of complementarity that is required for centralization to be desirable. 28 Yet, if local public investments are 'perfect'substitutes -i.e. = 0 -then decentralization is most preferred by the median voters irrespective of the size of spillovers. This result contrasts strongly with previous political economy studies on the trade-o¤ between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. Indeed, following Oates'Decentralization Theorem, the drawback with a decentralized system is typically re ‡ected by the inability of local governments to internalize public good externalities, while the ine¢ ciency of a centralized system stems from political economy considerations. Therefore, in general, there is a threshold level of externalities above which the bene…ts of improved coordination are larger than the costs of the political ine¢ ciencies of centralization.
In fact, Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelfsema (2005) and a number of other scholars, assume that voters' preferences are separable in the levels of public spending in di¤erent regions. It follows that under a decentralized system, there are no strategic interactions across regions: the level of public investment decided by one representative has no e¤ect on that chosen by the representative of the other region. 29 In other words, the outcome of a decentralized system is an equilibrium in dominant strategies and equilibrium best-response curves are two straight lines with 0 slope. It has the important implication that there are no incentives for strategic delegation under decentralization, so that the drawback of decentralization is completely characterized by the free-rider problem in public good provision.
In the present analysis, strategic delegation occurs under both centralization and decentralization as a consequence of the existence of strategic interactions in the public good game. This is the case even though local public investments are assumed to be 'perfect' substitutes, i.e. = 0, so that the public good surplus in each region is a concave function of the (weighted) sum of local public goods. As already explained, this implies that median voters appoint 'conservative'representatives. In turn, this accentuates the classic free-rider problem and the under-provision of public goods, thus making decentralization even more ine¢ cient than in Besley and Coate (2003) .
At …rst sight, this might seem surprising because when = 0 (and = 1), Proposition 3 implies that decentralization dominates centralization even though local public investments correspond very closely 2 8 We can also compare the threshold value~ to the su¢ cient condition used for proving the existence of a LNSPE under a decentralized system (see Proposition 1). In fact, for = 0:5, the condition in question is given by = (1=4) h p 33 5 i ' 0:19 (see the separate appendix). Numerically, we have that~ for any & 0:42, in which case centralization dominates decentralization under the su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the existence of a LNSPE in a decentralized system. 2 9 For example, the utility from public goods in Besley and Coate (2003) is given by (with our notations):
[ (1 ) ln(e j ) + ln(e j )]. The cross-derivatives with respect to e j and e j are equal to 0, which means that there are no strategic interactions. Again, this corresponds to the special case of = in our framework.
to the provision of a pure global public good, i.e. approaches 1. 30 But, the ine¢ ciency of centralized decision-making is even stronger in our framework with = 0 (and = 1). Under centralization, the separability assumption of Besley and Coate (2003) implies that electing a representative with a higher taste for public goods increases domestic spending but also increases -to a lesser extent -foreign public spending. In the present analysis with = 0, appointing a 'liberal'agent increases domestic spending but reduces foreign spending regardless of . 31 Consequently, each median voter has stronger incentives to elect a 'liberal'representative, which accentuates the over-provision of public goods and the ine¢ ciency of centralized decision-making compared to Besley and Coate (2003) . Furthermore, we have seen that with complete cost sharing -i.e. = 1 -each median voter appoints an extreme 'liberal'representative, that is a type 2m representative independently of the size of the spillover e¤ects (i.e.,~ j =0; =1 = 2m).
This can explain why centralization never dominates decentralization in the 'perfect-substitutes'case. representatives under decentralization. However, they do not investigate the relative welfare performance of the two systems with this extension. Presumably, this is because there is no trade-o¤ in this case as it is shown here.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a number of empirical studies showing that there exist strategic interactions in public spending between neighboring jurisdictions and, moreover, these studies conclude (in general) to the presence of a strategic complementarity. That being said, the present analysis applies to both strategic complementarity and substitutability in public spending. 32 Simply, with a common …nancing rule, local public investments must not be 'perfect' substitutes for centralization to possibly dominate decentralization. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the welfare di¤erence between the two systems with or without common …nancing of local public goods -given by (A46) and (A47)
in the appendix -is non-monotonic in for any 2 [0; 1] and non-monotonic in as well for any 3 0 When = 0 and = 1, the equilibrium under centralization is not de…ned if we further assume = 1, as it can be seen from (16) . Under decentralization, no public goods are supplied in equilibrium in this case, as shown by (10). 3 1 With = 0, we indeed have that @ẽ B =@ A and @ẽ A =@ A are of opposite signs. This can be seen from equation (A37) in the Appendix. 3 2 Notice also that ~ -and 3 2 p 2 -does not necessarily imply that local public investments must be strategic complements since these two conditions can be satis…ed for = 0:5.
(1; +1)
. 33 In other words, an increase in spillovers or in the degree of complementarity between local public investments does not necessarily make centralization relatively more attractive, whether it is welfare-superior to decentralization or not.
Conclusion
This paper revisits the traditional analysis of the political economy of (de)centralization by assuming a generalized CES function for aggregating local public investments with spillover e¤ects. Depending on the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy to either 'conservative' or to 'liberal' representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the …rst case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local public spending relative to the size of the spillover e¤ects. Finally, we show that, with a common budget …nancing rule, large public good externalities are not su¢ cient for a centralized system to dominate a decentralized system from the median voters'point of view. Indeed, it also requires a minimum degree of complementarity between local public investments.
In this study, we tried to generalize previous political economy studies of the trade-o¤ between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods with spillover e¤ects. However, our formal analysis can be criticized on several fronts. First, we assumed that voters'preferences are quasi-linear in private consumption. This is a very common assumption in the political economy literature partly because it serves to guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. Yet, this modeling assumption implies that there are no income e¤ects on public good provision, which may not be an appropriate assumption for all types of (local) public goods. Second, we assumed perfectly identical regions, which greatly simpli…es the analysis in that it allows focusing on symmetric equilibria only. But, even in this case, a centralized system need not be more e¢ cient than a decentralized system. We conjecture that it should be also the case in presence of some source of asymmetry across regions, although the equilibrium levels of public spending -under both a decentralized and a centralized system -would be di¤erent across regions. It must be remembered also that if regions were heterogeneous, we would lose the symmetry of the model and thus would no be able to obtain closed form solutions. 
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
The …rst derivative of v j (e) given by (3) with respect to e j is given by
From (1), we have that @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j , and hence
Now, calculating the derivative of (A2) with respect to e j , we have
which can be rewritten as
) be the elasticity of the marginal utility for public good consumption and factorizing by F 0 (G j ), we obtain
We also have @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j . Hence, (A5) can be rewritten as
Therefore, @ 2 v j (e)=@e j @e j is positive (respectively negative) and local public investments are strategic complements (respectively substitutes) for larger (respectively lower) than .
Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Existence: We …rst show that the game of public good provision admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. First, each region's representative can at most invest its private endowment, y, in the public good so that the strategy space of each representative is a compact interval, S = [0; y]. We now show that the maximization problem of each representative is strictly concave. Using (A1), the second derivative of v j (e) with respect to e j is given by
The …rst term in f:g is negative since F 00 (:) < 0. The sign of the second term is the same as the sign of
We have @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j and hence
Again, @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j , so that (A8) can be rewritten as follows
This (second) derivative is strictly negative since
j given by (A7) is strictly negative. Speci…cally (and for future use), substituting and using = [F 00 (G j (e)) :G j (e)]=F 0 (G j (e)), (A10) can be rewritten as 
As a result v j (e) is strictly concave and continuous in e j for 2 [0; 1) or 2 (1; +1), which guarantees the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the …rst-order condition given by (4) is both necessary and su¢ cient for characterizing the best-response function of region j's representative.
(ii) Uniqueness: We …rst observe that there does not exist an equilibrium in which for one region a corner solution at zero public investments is obtained while an interior solution holds for the other region for any 2 f[0; 1) [ (1; +1)g. First, for 2 [0; 1), the …rst-order condition (4) cannot be satis…ed for e j = 0 and e j > 0 because in that case G j (e) > 0 and the left-hand term of (4) approaches in…nity.
Second, if 2 (1; +1) and e j = 0 then, as mentioned in the text, we take the limit of (1), i.e. G j (e) = 0 and G j (e) = 0. Hence, v j (e) is strictly decreasing in e j , and so e j = 0 and e j = 0 are mutually best responses.
Next, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium with e j > 0, for j = A; B, when local public investments are strategic substitutes -i.e. 
1 . This can be rewritten as
], which is negative for < (so that the LHT is decreasing in G j (e)). Hence, we must have G j (e 0 ) > G j (e) for satisfying the …rst-order condition in region j when e 0 j < e j . However, G j (e 0 ) > G j (e) and e 0 j < e j necessarily imply e 0 j > e j and G j (e 0 ) > G j (e). But for region j, the RHT of the …rst-order condition is (also) increasing in e j and the LHT is (also) decreasing G j (e). Therefore, one cannot have another equilibrium e 0 6 = e, which satis…es the two …rst-order conditions. To summarize, there is a unique equilibrium which involves e A > 0 and e B > 0 for 2 [0; ).
Suppose now that 2 ( ; +1). In an interior equilibrium, public good provision is still characterized by the …rst-order condition (4) with equality. This equation implicitly de…nes e j = ' ( j ; e j ). By the implicit function theorem, '(:) is continuous and furthermore
j being strictly negative (from Lemma 2). Using (A6) and (A11), we have
which is positive for > (and negative for < ). When > , one can also observe that @ 2 e j =@e 2 j < 0, so that best-response functions are increasing at a decreasing rate. We also have that (@e j =@e j ) je j !0 = +1, which means that near the origin, each best-response function must be on the upper side of the 45 line. At the other extreme, we have (@e j =@e j ) je j !+1 = 0, so that each best-response function must cross the 45 line. Since its slope is always decreasing, each best-response function cross the 45 line only once. There is thus a unique equilibrium which involves e A > 0 and e B > 0 for 2 ( ; +1). 
Proof of Lemma 3
We …rst show that e j and G j (e) are increasing in j . Equilibrium public good provision is characterized by the …rst-order condition (4). Again, this equation implicitly de…nes e j = ' ( j ; e j ). By the implicit function theorem,
. It follows that @e j =@ j > 0. This also implies that @G j (e) =@ j > 0 since G j (e) is increasing in e j .
Next suppose that 0 > and j > 0 j . The inequality w j ( ; j ; j ) w j ( ;
The right-hand term and the term in [:] in the left-hand side are both strictly positive (since F (:) is also an increasing function). So, if this inequality is veri…ed for a type citizen in region j, it is also obviously veri…ed for a type 0 citizen with 0 > , i.e., w j ( 0 ; j ; j ) w j ( 0 ; 0 j ; j ). Suppose now that 0 < and j < 0 j . The inequality w j ( ; j ; j ) w j ( ;
. Again, the right-hand term and the term in [:] in the left-hand side are both strictly positive.
So if this inequality is veri…ed for a type citizen in region j, it is also obviously veri…ed for a type 0 citizen with 0 < , i.e., w j ( 0 ; j ; j ) w j ( 0 ; 0 j ; j ).
Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we just assume the existence of a LNSPE (under the su¢ cient condition that ) and characterize the properties of this equilibrium. We also show that if a symmetric LNSPE exists, then this equilibrium is unique. The proof of the existence of such an equilibrium under decentralization is given in a separate appendix. In this second appendix, we also show that, in the case of a decentralized system, there exists a SPNE for = 0 and 2 [ ; 1). This additional appendix is available upon request.
(i) in a LNSPE, the preferred representative of region j's median voter is given by the …rst-order condition (6) . We …rst derive the expression for @e j =@ j . For expositional convenience only let j A and j B, so that we …rst determine @e B =@ A . Using (4), e B must satisfy
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to A yields
Factorizing by B e 1 B
[G B (e )]
1 , the equality (A14) reduces to
Now, factorizing by F 0 (G B (e )) and use = [F 00 (G j (e)) :G j (e)]=F 0 (G j (e)), then the equality (A15) reduces to
We also have G B (e ) = e and hence
Substituting this expression into (A16), we have
Factorizing by [G B (e )] and observing that [G B (e )]
, the equality (A18) reduces to
This implies
Now, assuming that the median voters in both regions have the same taste parameter m, this implies that A = B = and e A = e B = e . In a symmetric equilibrium, (A20) then reduces to
Substituting into the …rst-order condition (6) then yields
The solution of this equation is thus given by (7) in Proposition 1.
(ii) We have
Proof of Lemma 4
We show that aggregated payo¤ given by (12) is strictly concave, so that a unique solutions results.
Now, calculating the second derivative of v j (e) with respect to e j , we obtain
The …rst term in f:g is negative since F 00 (:) < 0. The sign of the second term in f:g is the same as the
We have @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j , and hence
Again, @G j (e) =@e j = [G j (e)] e j so that (A25) can be rewritten as follows
which is strictly negative since
Together with Lemma 2, we have that v j (e) + v j (e) is strictly concave in e j . There is thus a unique solution which is given by the (necessary and su¢ cient) …rst-order condition (13).
Proof of Proposition 2
Again for this proof, we just assume the existence of a LNSPE (under the su¢ cient condition that 0:5)
and characterize the properties of this equilibrium. The proof of existence of such an equilibrium under centralization is given in a separate appendix, which is available upon request.
In a LNSPE, the preferred representative of region j's median voter is given by the …rst-order condition (14) . We then need to derive the expression of @ẽ j =@ j . Again, for expositional convenience only, we derive the outcome of the delegation stage for region A keeping in mind that the same reasoning will apply for region B. Hence, we …rst characterize @ẽ B =@ A .
Using (13),ẽ A andẽ B are such that
We then obtain
Substituting into (13) -with j B and j A -and simplifying, we have
We also have
Substituting into (A30) and factorizing by [G B (ẽ)] 2 1 , we have
Now, factorizing by F 0 (G B (ẽ)) and using = [F 00 (G j (e)) :G j (e)]=F 0 (G j (e)) gives
Now, using (A29), we have
Observing that
, we have
We then have
As for the decentralization system, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium i.e. m A = m B = m, which implies A = B = andẽ A =ẽ B =ẽ. The above expression then reduces to
In addition, from (13), we also have in a symmetric equilibrium
Substituting this last expression into (14) (with m j = m) yields
Finally, substituting (A37) into (A38) yields
The solution of this equation in is thus given by (15) in Proposition 2.
(ii) It is immediately veri…ed that~ T m if T~ with~ 2 = (1 + ).
Welfare under decentralization and centralization
From (4) 
We then obtain the following level of welfare for the median voter under a decentralized system,
Assuming that = 0:5, we obtain (17) in the text.
Using (13) with
, we obtain the level of public investment in each region in the symmetric equilibrium of a centralized system, that isẽ = h~ (1 ) (1 + ) 
We then obtain the following level of welfare for the median voter under a centralized system. 
Assuming that = 0:5, we obtain (18) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) When = 0, we have under a centralized system
while for = 1, we havẽ
The welfare of each region under a decentralized system is still given by (17) .
Hence, when = 0, the welfare di¤erence between a centralized and a decentralized system is given by
This expression is clearly positive for any 2 f[0; 1) ; (1; +1)g and 2 [0; 1].
When = 1, the welfare di¤erence between a centralized and a decentralized system is given bỹ
The sign of~ j =1 is the same as the sign of
which is quadratic in . Thus ( ; ) = 0 has two solutions given bŷ
Clearly,^ is negative while~ is positive if only if 6
Furthermore, the second derivative of ( ; ) with respect to is also positive if In this appendix, we prove the existence of a (symmetric) Local Nash Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) in pure strategies under both a decentralized system and a centralized system. We also show the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies under decentralization and for a speci…c range of the parameters of the model.
1 Existence of a (Symmetric) Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE)
Decentralization
The payo¤ for the region A's median voter in the …rst stage of the game under decentralization is given by
. The …rst derivative of w A with respect to A after substituting the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage (given by (4)) -and eliminating the " " in order to reduce the amount of notation -is given by (6):
The second derivative of w A with respect to A is thus given by
In a symmetric equilibrium with e A = e B = e, we have
We have (from (A21)) (@e
Rearranging the terms, we have
We now determine (@ 2 e B =@ 2 A ). We have (from (A20))
We have
We have,
Substituting (B6) into this expression and rearranging the terms, we obtain 
We thus have
It follows that
with X( A ) and Z( A ) given by (B6) and (B15) respectively.
We now evaluate this derivative in a symmetric equilibrium. We …rst have
Hence, we have
Substituting into (B5) and rearranging the terms, we can obtain after some tedious manipulations
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have A = = (1 + ) [ (1 ) + ] m= ( + ), and hence the …rst term is equal to 0. Observe also that the second term reduces to (1= A ) (@e A =@ A ) j e . As a result the second derivative of w A with respect to A in the symmetric equilibrium is …nally given by
We also need to determine (@e A =@ A ) j e . Rewrite the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage (given by (4)) as -and still eliminating the " " superscripts -F (e A ; e B (e A ); A ) = 0. Again, in the …rst stage, the median voter of each region anticipates the other-region representative's best-response in the second stage.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have @e
F (e A ; e B (e A ); A ) = 0 is given by 
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have
Substituting into (B20), we have
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have A = = (1 + ) [ (1 ) + ] m= ( + ). Thus the above expression reduces to
This expression is negative, which implies that
Note …rst that this inequality is always veri…ed for 2 [ ; 1). We also have 
Centralization
The payo¤ for the region A's median voter in the …rst stage of the game under decentralization is given
From the equilibrium conditions in the second stage we have using (A29) -and omitting the "tilde" to reduce the amount of notation: (14), the …rst derivative of w A with respect to A can be rewritten as .
We …rst have
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have K( A ) j e = e = [ A (1 + )] and
We have (from (A37)) (@e
into the above expression, we can obtain
We also have in the symmetric equilibrium
Substituting (B36) and (B37) into Y 1 ( A ) and simplifying, we have
Regarding Y 2 ( A ) in the symmetric equilibrium, we have
we can obtain
Regarding Y 3 ( A ) in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
We therefore need to characterize (@ 2 e B =@ 2 A ). We have (from (A36))
and where U ( A ) and V ( A ) correspond to the numerator and to the denominator of X( A ) respectively.(B44)
We have 
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
Again, we have (@e
We also have V ( A ) j e = [2 + (1 )]. It follows that
As a result, we have
And then, we have 
In a symmetric equilibrium, it reduces to
We also have, A su¢ cient condition for this last inequality to be satis…ed is that = 1= [2(2 )]. is increasing in and hence reach a maximum in = 1, in which case = 1=2. We exclude the situation with = 0 together with = 1, since no public goods are supplied in this case. Hence, for 0:5 the two inequalities are strict. Hence, a su¢ cient condition for the second derivative of w A with respect to A in A =~ to be strictly negative is that 0:5, thus proving the the existence of a symmetric Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) in pure strategies under a centralized system.
Existence of a (Symmetric) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) under a Decentralized System
Under a decentralized system, one can nevertheless show the existence of a (symmetric) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies for = 0, = and 2 ( ; 1). Substituting e j and G j into the utility of the median voter given by mG 1 j e j , we obtain that it is separable in j and in j . It follows that each median has a dominant strategy in this case as well. Therefore, the SPNE always exists for = 0 or = .
Decentralization
The case of 2 ( ; 1): Strategic Complementarity
The payo¤ for the region A's median voter in the …rst stage of the game is given by w A = mF [G A (e ( A ; B ) )] e A ( A ; B ) . The …rst derivative of w A with respect to A after substituting the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage (given by (4) ) is given by (6) When > , we have that > m. Suppose …rst hat A < which leads to e A < e B . Indeed, as
shown in the previous section of this appendix, the equilibrium level of public investment in one region is increasing in the type of its representative (see equation (B26)). When > , local public investments are strategic complements and, so, the level of public investment in the other region decreases as well.
But it decreases by a lower extent since the slope of each best-response function is lower than 1 at the equilibrium point (which can be seen in Figure 2 ). 
which is always veri…ed for A > . It follows that Y (e A ; e B ; m; A ) is negative for any A > when 2 ( ; 1).
As result each median voter's payo¤ is quasi-concave, which implies that a symmetric SPNE exists for 2 ( ; 1). Unfortunately, the same type of reasoning does not apply for = 2 ( ; 1).
Centralization
Showing the existence of a SPNE in pure strategies in the case of a centralized system is even more problematic, except for the very speci…c cases of = -i.e. separability of local public goods in the utility of voters -and = 0 -i.e. perfect substitutability between local public investments. 
